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Hellewell: The McCarran Amendment - A Method of Clarifying the Implied Reser

THE MC CARRAN AMENDMENT - A METHOD OF
CLARIFYING THE IMPLIED RESERVATION DOCTRINE*
In the arid West, water rights are the crucial factor in
determining what land will become economically productive,
and what land will lie fallow. So much of the West's economic growth depends on the ability to have water available
for use that any threat of losing the right to such use causes
grave concern among water users. One such threat to water
rights is the implied reservation doctrine.' The reasoning
upon which the doctrine rests is that first the United States
gained paramount title to all the land (and things appurtenant thereto) which constituted the western United States.
The Government then encouraged development and disposed
of some of this land under various acts of Congress. The Supreme Court in interpreting one of these acts' said that title
to water not previously appropriated or transferred under
this act did not pass with subsequent transfer of the land.3
Thus, since the Government owned this water when it set
aside or reserved certain lands, it also reserved enough of
the previously unappropriated water for the reservation
purposes, and subsequent private appropriations took subject
to the federal rights.4
*This comment was partially financed by the Water Resources Research Institute of the University of Wyoming.
1. See Wheatley & Corker, STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND
USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS. S-15-16 (1969): [hereinafter referred to as STUDY]. The following can be described as the elements of the implied reservation doctrine as proposed by the Government.
a. When the federal government made a reservation or withdrawal of land
(e.g., national forests), it also impliedly reserved the right to enough
water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation.
b. The amount of water reserved is the amount needed both now and in the
future for the needs of the reservation.
c. The Government's water right is not dependent upon the application of
the water to a beneficial use as state laws require, nor is it lost by
non-use.
d. The right has a priority date from the time of the creation of the reservation and is junior only to those private appropriations prior to the
reservation date.
e. The reservation of the land and the water can be made by either Congress
or by executive order of the President.
See also Moses, Federal-State Water Problems, 47 DENVER L.J. 194, 207
(1970); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) ; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1968).
2. Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
3. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
(1935).
4. See Warner, Federal Reserved Water Rights and their Relationship to
Appropriative Rights in the Western States, 15 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
399 (1969) ; Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966) ; Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV.
638 (1957).
Copyright@ 1972 by the University of Wyoming
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The Court took a long time to completely adopt the doctrine. It was first invoked to protect the water of an Indian
reservation created by treaty.' This decision was somewhat
based on public policy to protect Indians.' Later the doctrine
was applied to an Indian reservation created by executive
order.' Finally, the Court applied this doctrine to all federal
land reservations8 and has since reaffirmed these prior decisions.9 This doctrine is looked upon by many as a type of federal water right that, if ever used as proposed, could destroy
many state-created water rights.10 To date only one case has
been found where a state-created water right has been destroyed," but the implications are awesome enough to produce
a great deal of controversy. Once the doctrine was formally
established, the emphasis of its opposition turned to trying to
limit its definition and potential effect.
The problems raised by this doctrine can be divided basically into two areas. First, the invocation of the sovereign immunity doctrine by the United States can militate against
parties bringing suit to establish their relative water rights
vis-a-vis those of the United States. The second area concerns
the determination of the quantitive extent of the United
States' water right under the doctrine and the consequences
thereof to the holders of private rights.
In order to solve some of the issues surrounding the
reservation doctrine (e.g., the amount of water the Government is entitled to, the amount of compensation if any, and
the priority date) the United States must be brought into
court. To do so, the United States must first waive its sovereign immunity. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune
Congress alone
from suit save as it consents to be sued.'
5. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
6. Id. at 577.
7. United States v. Walker River Irrigation District, 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir.
1939).
8. FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
9. United States v. District Court for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520
(1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
10. See generally Corker, Water Rights and Federalism--The Western Water
Rights Settlement Bill of 1957, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 638 (1957); Munro, The
Pelton Decision: A New Riparianism?36 ORE L. REv. 221 (1957).
11. Glenn v. United States, Civil No. C-153-61 (D. Utah Mar. 16, 1963).
12. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
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can waive the immunity of the United States from suit."3 Before sovereign immunity is considered waived, there must be
specific legislative action by Congress. 4
In the field of adjudication of water rights, Congress
passed, as part of the Department of Justice Appropriation
Act of July 10, 1952,"5 the McCarran Amendment. The McCarran Amendment granted a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity,"0 thereby providing the only means available to
bring the United States into court in order to solve the quesUntil
tions raised by the implied reservation doctrine.'
recently, because of ambiguities and bad drafting, the McCarran Amendment has been a disappointing means of determining the extent of the Government's reserved water rights. 8
Because of the previous lack of success of the McCarran
Amendment, United States v. DistrictCourt for the County of
Eagle 9 and United States v. District Court for Water Division No. 5,20 are noted as important breakthroughs in this area
of the law. It is the purpose of this comment to review these
two cases with respect to their place in the development of the
case law in this area and their contribution to solving the
problems surrounding the implied reservation doctrine, including those added by the McCarran Amendment.
United States v. District Court for the County of Eagle"
arose out of an attempt to join the United States in a suit to
adjudicate water rights on the Eagle River in Colorado. The
United States, as a water user in the Eagle River Water District, was served with notice of a suit to settle water rights in
the district. This notice required the United States to defend
13. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1935).
14. Id. at 34.
15. Department of Justice Appropriation Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 651, § 208
(a)-(c), 66 Stat. 560, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as
the McCarran Amendment].
16. See Appendix.
17. See PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMM., ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND:
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS, 141-55 (1970) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]; Hillhouse, The Public Land Law Review Commission Report. Icebreaking in Reserved Waters? 4 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 369 (1971); Moses, Federal-StateWater Problems, 47 DENVER L.J. 194
(1970).
18. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 106.2 (Clark ed. 1967).
19. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
20. 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
21. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
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in the District Court of Eagle County its claim to water in
the Eagle River. The United States moved for dismissal on
the grounds that it had not consented to be sued. The Colorado
court denied the motion, holding that the United States had
consented to this suit since this was the type of suit Congress
had contemplated when it lowered the bar of sovereign immunity with the MeCarran Amendment.2 2 The Government,
after losing in the Colorado Supreme Court, then appealed
directly to the United States Supreme Court.
In deciding Eagl County, the Court considered several
of the major questions surrounding both the reservation doctrine and the McCarran Amendment. One of the first issues
resolved was whether the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction.2 3 In In re Green River Drainage Area,2 4 a federal
district court found that Congress did not intend that the
waiver of immunity be conditional on suits brought in federal
courts. Out of apparent distrust for state courts, the Government did not accept this interpretation and raised the
issue again. In Eagle County the Supreme Court resolved the
issue when it held that any federal questions presented could
be preserved and taken to federal court for review. Nevertheless, the original decision could be in the state courts.
A more fundamental question which Eagle County resolved was whether the Government's reserved water rights
were subject to adjudication under the McCarran Amendment. The Government contended that section 666(a) (2)25
restricted the Amendment's waiver of immunity to only appropriative rights acquired under state law.2 8 The Govern27
ment's contention was based on the ejusdem generis doctrine,
whereby the word "otherwise" would operate to include only
water rights acquired by appropriation, purchase, or exchange.2" However, the Court found the Government's read22. 458 P.2d 760 (Colo. 1969).
23. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
24. 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956).
25.

See Appendix.

26. 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971).
27. See generally Comment, Adjudication of Water Rights Claimed by the
United States-Application of Common Law Remedies and the McCarran
Amendment of 1952, 48 CALIF. L. REv 94 (1960).

28. The argument is that since the Government was claiming only reserved
water rights on the Eagle River, the doctrine of ejusdem generis excluded
them from the statute's application.
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ing of the statute was incorrect. The Court determined that
the broader provision, section 666 (a) (1), was the applicable
one, even if the Government's interpretation of section 666(a)
(2) was correct. The Court said: "[W]e deal with an allinclusive statute concerning the adjudication of rights to the
use of water of a river system which in section 666(a) (1)
had no exceptions and which, as we read it includes appropriative rights, riparian rights, and reserved rights.""'
For some time there was serious question whether the
Amendment applied to anything less than a complete river
system, i.e., a major river and all its tributaries. The early
cases that considered this problem, Miller v. Jennings" and
1 indicated that less than a comCaliforniav. United States,"
plete river system was unacceptable.
The only proper method of adjudicating the rights
on a stream, whether riparian or appropriative or
mixed, is to have all owners of lands on the watershed
and all appropriators who use water from the stream
in another watershed in court at the same
involved
32
time.
In 1968 this line of thinking still persisted when once
again a court dismissed an attempted water rights adjudication of less than the entire river system. 3 Clearly the remedies of those wishing to solve the problems in this area were,
practically speaking, non-existent. The reason for this lack
of a remedy was due to the practical impossibility of joining
and attaining jurisdiction over the thousands of water rights
holders on any major stream system. This is not to say that
the courts had no cause for finding such a stringent reading
necessary. Some of the legislative deliberations on the McCarran Amendment used this same kind of language, and the
Supreme Court felt this reading gave distinct advantages.34
In fact, the language of one congressional report said that the
Amendment's purpose was
401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971).
243 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1957).
235 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1956).
California v. United States, 235 F.2d 647, 663 (9th Cir. 1956).
United States v. Hennen, 360 F. Supp. 256 (D. Nev. 1968); see also City
of Chino v. Superior Court of Orange County, 255 Cal. App. 2d 747, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 532 (1967).
84. Pacific Livestock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., 241 U.S. 440, 454 (1916).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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to allow the United States to be joined in a suit
wherein it is necessary to adjudicate all of the rights
of the various owners on a given stream. This is so
because unless all of the parties owning or in the
process of acquiring water rights on a particular
stream can be joined as parties defendant, any subsequent decree would be of little value."
However, another major accomplishment of Eagle County
was the clarification and narrowing of the definition of the
term "river system" in the statute from that given by previous cases.36 Rejecting a definition from an earlier case,"
the Court said:
We deem almost frivolous the suggestion that the
Eagle and its tributaries are not a "river system"
within the meaning of the Act. No suit by any State
could possibly encompass all of the water rights in
the entire Colorado River which runs through or
touches many States. The "river system" must be
read as embracing one within the particular State's
jurisdiction. 8
Previously, another major stumbling block has been in
the type of suit allowed. The language of the Court and some
of the legislative history required a general adjudication. 9
The Court of Appeals in State v. Rank gave a definition of the
type of suits needed to join the United States.4" This case
also provided an insight into what courts consider constitutes
a general adjudication:
[T]here can be little doubt as to the type of suit
Congress had in mind. It was not a dispute between
certain water users as to their use of water of a
stream system; rather it was the quasi-public proceeding which in the law of western waters is known
as a "general adjudication" of a stream system; one
in which the rights of all claimants on a stream system as between themselves, are ascertained and officially stated."
35. S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 9 (1951).
36. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963) ; Turner v. Kings River Conservation Dist., 360 F.2d 184, 197 (9th Cir. 1966).
37. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963).
38. 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971).
39. S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 4, 5 (1951).
40. State v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340, 349 (9th Cir. 1961).
41. Id. at 347. See also STUDY, supra note 1, at 191.
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Dugan v. Rank was an action by several of the downstream
owners of riparian and overlying land on the San Joaquin
River. These landowners wanted to enjoin officials of the Bureau of Reclamation from impounding water in a federal dam,
contrary to the rights of these owners in the beneficial use of
the waters. Because of the general adjudication requirement,
Dugan held this was not a proper suit to bring under the McCarran Amendment."2
Using the reasoning of Dugan, the Government argued
that the Colorado proceeding in Eagle County was not a
general one. The Court answerd by saying: "This proceeding, unlike the one in Dugan is not a private one to determine
whether named claimants have priority over the United
States. The whole community of claims is involved." 43 As
such, it was general and thus within the purview of the statute giving consent to join the United States as defendant in
certain suits involving the adjudication of water rights.
Finally, the Government argued that the McCarran
Amendment did not apply because the purpose of the original proceeding was merely to update the water rights on the
Eagle River, and many of the holders of these water rights
were not present before the court. The Court found this argument extremely technical and refused to so confine the McCarran Amendment.4 The Court, discarding the Government's contention, said that "the absence of owners of previously decreed rights may present problems going to the
merit,""2 but the Court felt that these problems could be
dealt with when they arose, as they were federal questions and
fully reviewable. The water rights not represented in the
present case were not enough to prevent the United States
from being joined in a suit under the McCarran Amendment.
The companion case to Eagle County, United States v.
District Court for Water Division No. 5,6 also presented Mc-

Carran Amendment problems. Water Division No. 5 involved
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963).
401 U.S. 520, 525 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 525-26.
401 U.S. 527 (1971).
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a new Colorado statute, enacted after the Eagle County case
had commenced, which allowed monthly proceedings before a
Colorado district court acting as a water referee. 7 This court
was to consider only those claims filed with, it during the previous month. As in Eagle County, the issue before the Court
was whether Colorado's new statute was such that there could
be joinder of the United States in a suit pursuant to the McCarran Amendment. After Eagle County, the Couyt had little
trouble in finding that all claims would be eventually adjudicated. The fact that the proceedings were held on a month-bymonth basis did not prevent the adjudication of all water
rights "inclusively and in the totality."4"
These two cases have formulated important rules. However, not all important issues have been solved. The most
important, and certainly most controversial of these issues,
concerns compensation of those who may have their water
rights destroyed. Under present rules, if the reservation
doctrine is invoked, individuals who lose their water rights
will not be compensated. It is the position of the Government that the federal reserved water rights have the status
of appropriative rights. Thus, water appropriated after the
Government's priority date (determined by the date of the
particular reservation) and after the Desert Land Act of
1877 is subject to all water reserved by the Government. Those
who appropriated before this date have priority over the
Government."
The proponents of the private interests contend, on the
other hand, that this right was not established in court until
1 and none of the private
the case of Arizona v. California"
appropriators had notice or reason to know of any such right
of the Government until this case. Those who appropriated
many years ago did not have a chance to know their claims
were subject to others not appearing on record. The Government had invited these people to invest their lives and
47. Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969, CoLO. Rv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 to -45 (Supp. 1969).
48. 401 U.S. 527, 529 (1971).
49. STUDY, supra note 1; see also Glenn v. United States, supra note 11.
50. STUDY, supra note 1.
51. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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money in land, machinery, and irrigation projects. They believed the water rights they received were valid, and it is upon
these water rights that so much depends. It is suggested that
for the sake of justice these people should be paid for the
serious harm which will result from the Government taking
whatever water it needs.2
Another of the problems Eagle County and Water Division No. 5 left unsolved was the amount of water the Government's water right entitles it to. The Supreme Court in
Eagle County, avoiding the question directly, said such questions if decided in a state proceeding were federal questions
and entitled to review in federal courts.53 While the Supreme
Court avoided making the initial decision to apportion the
water, it did seem to leave the door open for the state courts
to begin the job of quantifying the federal government's reserved rights. If true, this could lead to the accomplishment
of the main objectives of those who oppose the reservation
doctrine.
A third and very important unresolved question arises
in states like Wyoming which adjudicate water rights administratively. The Wyoming system carries on the general
determination process before an administrative agency rather
than judicially. The court in Rank v. Krug mentioned an initial reaction to this problem though the issue was not before
it. The court, citing another case in Rank,5 4 said by common
understanding the word "adjudicated" means determination
by a court or judge in a judicial proceeding. It requires a
judgment or decree by a court.5 Going further, the court in
Rank said, "[I]n view of the meaning of the word 'suit'
the words 'adjudication' or 'administration' of rights in
a suit clearly contemplate judicial action. Courts of equity
in carrying out a decree of adjudication of water rights have
traditionally undertaken the administration of water
52. REPORT, supra note 17, at 141-55; see also Corker, Federal-State Relations
in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration, 17 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.
INST. 579, 581, 602 (1971).
53. 401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971).
54. 142 F. Supp. 1, 73 (1956), citing Goldwyn v. United Artists Corp., 113 F.2d
703 (3rd Cir. 1940).
65. Id.
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rights."" While the court in Rank used this language about
administrative handling of the problem, the issue was not
before the court and thus it has not been determined that a
suit is the exclusive remedy. One writer, however, has concluded from Rank that it is impossible for a state administrative proceeding to come under the McCarran Amendment."
Another writer, on the other hand, has said that Congress
could not have intended that Colorado and Montana (by virtue of their special statutes) should adjudicate water rights
with the United States while intending that Wyoming (and
states following this type of water rights administration
system) " could not do so 9 because the initial proceeding is
administrative."
CONCLUSION

With the decisions in Eagle County and Water Division
No. 5 several of the questions surrounding the McCarran
Amendment were answered. The most important was the
modification of the requirements for the McCarran Amendment to apply. The United States can now be joined much
easier. Thus, issues previously blocked by the inability to sue
can now be raised.
Not all problems are settled, and even with these two cases
there will be much discord. The questions concerning the
quantitive extent of rights under the implied reservation doctrine and the relative priorities thereof still remain. When
these problems are aired in court, will the Government get
an ideal water right of unlimited quantity and flexibility,
coupled with very early priority dates ? There are hints that
the courts will not adopt such a liberal water right for the
Government, but the strength of these hints is questionable.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp. 1, 73 (1956), citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589 (1945)..
Comment, supra note 27, at 117.
Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MT. L. Riv. 464, 495 (1960).
Id. at 495, citing Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution
of Waters by the State-via Irrigation, 1 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 161 (1928).
Mr. Trelease cites no case law, but in another area of the law, the Supreme
Court has ruled that a Federal Trade Commission Clayton Act administrative proceeding "can be considered as a 'civil or criminal' proceeding."
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311 (1965).
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The Court in Arizona v. California and Eagle County indicated that the quantity of water may be limited. For example,
the Court in Arizona v. California, in its decree designating
the amounts of water the various parties were to receive, set
a quantity for the Indian reservation involved in the suit.
The amount the reservation was to receive was fixed as that
amount which could be used to irrigate all of the irrigable
land on the reservation by current efficient practices. 1 Further, the Court in Eagle County said the amount awarded by
the state courts for other reservations was a reviewable federal
question. The last pronouncement indicates that while state
courts could adjudicate amounts, justice must be done to the
United States. Finally, the Eagle County and Water Division
No. 5 cases have been described by one writer as at least a
"modest victory" for those who think that state created
water rights deserve a better deal under the fifth and fourteenth amendments than in the past.2
A second question, notwithstanding the eventual scope of
the reservation doctrine, is whether those persons who lose
their water by the doctrine's use will be compensated for the
resulting loss. There are several places indicating that the
Court will not accept the Government's argument that, since
it is not taking anything the water holder owned, he should
not be compensated. First, the Public Land Law Review
Commission" stated in its recommendation number 56 that
compensation should be given for interfering with water rights
valid before Arizona v, Californiasince before this date there
was no notice to the holders that their claims were subject to
others. Also, there are Congressional pressures which would
force compensation and other pressures, not related to this
area, to give all citizens a remedy against the United States. 4
JOSEPH H. HEIE.WELL

61.
62.
63.
64.

873 U.S. 546, 595-97 (1963).
Corker, supra note 52, at 582.
REPORT, supra note 17, at 155.
S. 598, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
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APPENDIX

The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a)
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant
in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of
water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water
rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary
party to such suit. The United States, when a party to such
suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that
the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not
amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall
be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court
having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for
costs shall be entered against the United States in any such
suit.
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